PUBLIC SERVANTS AND PRIVATE FIDUCIARIES PARENTS: TRUSTED BUT NOT TRUSTEES OR (FOSTER) PARENTS AS FIDUCIARIES MARGARET F. BRINIG*
In April of 2010, the mass media was full of accounts of a seven-year-old Russian boy, Artyom (whose adoptive name is Justin), who had been returned to Moscow on his own by an American adoptive mother who felt unable to care for him. The mother, Torry Hansen, alleged that her family was afraid of the boy, specifically because he had threatened to bum their house down around them and had drawn pictures of it in flames.' She paid for someone to meet the child once he landed and had her mother deliver him to the gate before his ten hour flight. 2 While there could be many reasons for disquiet on hearing the story -not the least of which was putting that young a child onto a lengthy international flight unescorted -this Conference suggests that we pay attention to our feelings that Ms. Hansen at least attempted to do something that parents cannot: to give back a child. 2 Id. The incident sparked great outrage in Russia, which temporarily suspended all U.S. adoptions. Id. They were apparently not halted, however. Clifford J. Levy, Adoptions From Russia Continue, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A6.
3 As an article in the New York Times put it, "We do not know all the details. But returning a child like he was a damaged pair of pants is profoundly wrong." Editorial, A Safe, Loving Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at WK9. For just one of many such comments on the Internet, see Tasha Kheiriddin, You Can't 'Disannul' a Child, NAT'L POST, Apr. 11, 2010, http://network.nationalpost.com/NP/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2010/ 04/1 1/tasha-kheiriddin-you-can-t-quot-disannul-quot-a-child.aspx: "However, unlike consumer goods, children are not parcels to be sent or returned. Whatever his problems, Artyom deserved a better solution than a one-way plane ticket. One can only hope that he does get help, and finds a family willing to take on the challenge." One response to the Kheiriddin article clearly makes the point about the permanence of parenting responsibilities:
This selfish woman was unprepared to deal with a difficult child. What if he'd come into her world the usual way (pregnancy)? Should she be allowed to unload him like a puppy who pees in the house or a cat who claws the furniture? Even pets should be a
If parents were fiduciaries of the type that concerns Professor Frankel, they could withdraw. 4 This withdrawal might require court permission or finding a substitute or yielding to whoever was listed as a substitute in the trust or other fiduciary instrument. A trustee who declined to serve further might well suffer pecuniary loss, of the compensation specified in the trust instrument, any performance bond posted, or possible future remuneration coming from other trust opportunities. The withdrawing trustee would also probably and relatedly suffer a reputation loss, especially if the beneficiary or ward suffered during the transition. What will happen to Ms. Hansen? At the very least, she will suffer a lifetime of guilt. 5 Another "disrupted" adoptive mother was quoted in the New York Times:
"I felt that I was a failure and that I condemned her to a life of hopelessness," she said. "I knew I couldn't help her, but I knew I didn't want to throw her away. But sometimes as a parent you feel like you have a lot more power than you do. You say to yourself, 'Can I make a difference in this child's life?' And if the answer is no, you need to walk away." 6 As a third mother with a similarly difficult child adopted from Russia said, "I love him. I have loved him for over three years. Although I didn't lay eyes on him, I have been in love with this little boy for all this time. And just like my biological children, I cannot fathom turning my back on him." '7 Fifteen years ago, Elizabeth and Robert Scott described biological or adoptive parents as fiduciaries, with the autonomy and legal protections of lifetime (of the pet) commitment. Every detail of this story tells us that this was all about her. Parenthood is an absolute commitment. It all flows in one direction -to the child, for the benefit of child. It is not for the selfish. parenthood substituting for the pecuniary rewards other fiduciaries receive. 8 While their idea is justly famous, 9 and they themselves note that their analogy is imperfect, 10 this piece will focus on the differences between legal parents and fiduciaries rather than on the similarities the Scotts pointed out. The story of Artyom concerns the attempted unilateral severing of the relationship. But the differences I see in the way the idea of trust plays out in parenting extends beyond endpoints. While the Scotts use the words "trust" or "trustee" fifty-three times in their piece, there is only one occasion on which they are not referring to the fiduciary law capacity: "Parents in family units share their children's standard of living and, through informal influences, can usually be trusted collectively to take their children's needs into account in allocating family resources." Scott & Scott, supra note 8, at 2448.
As I have argued elsewhere in an extensive treatment of the interaction of families and community, "trust is related to society's choice of which relationships are deemed to be family, how the family works in creating social capital, and how burgeoning rights may threaten social capital. ' 12 For the purposes of this Essay, we can examine how societal trust in adults' ability to parent well affects whether or not they will be denoted legal "parents," with all the obligations and privileges the Scotts describe.
13
Since I have developed the full model elsewhere, 14 I will merely report briefly on one such difference -that between biological or adoptive parents and adults acting as foster parents or kin caregivers. Biological parents, or adoptive parents like Torry Hansen, are full parents in the eyes of the law.
15
As the Scotts note, parents will have to deviate in very major ways before the state will intervene to require particular actions or even, in extreme cases, to terminate parental rights. 16 I have argued that these parents bear the legal and social norm protection of full societal trust because they most often love their children unconditionally and permanently. ("Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit) there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.").
In order to overcome this presumption, parents must be found at least temporarily unfit (to have neglected, abandoned or abused the child). This finding, in turn, requires the use of substantial due process protections. 
19
The exception, which is described both in Brinig & Nock, supra note 14, at 463-67, and in Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, The One-Size-Fits-All Family, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137, 140 (2009), is that for African-American families, kinship caregiving works as well as does adoption in serving children's needs. One financial ramification of a kin caregiver adopting a child that may work in a perverse fashion is demonstrated by the Iowa law allowing "special needs" subsidies to be paid to parents adopting children who were their foster children. This benefit is not available for most kin caregivers, since the child must be placed from state care rather than directly by the biological parent or parents. We understand that the actual permanent legal custody of children placed in our home for Foster Care will remain in either the natural parent or parents of the child or the Department according to the facts of the individual case, and that by placing a child in our home for foster care, the Department does not confer any right to custody in us, and we hereby expressly waive any right to custody of a child placed in our home for Foster Care and expressly agree that we will not attempt to adopt any child placed in our home for Foster Care unless the child is made free for adoption by the written decision and action of the State Department of Public Welfare. Despite the contract, the majority found that in other cases foster parents had been permitted to adopt and that at least one social worker testified that "being licensed as a foster home was definitely an advantage to becoming a licensed adoptive home." Id.
The dissenting opinion not only quoted the contract but also found that the payment of money to the foster parents disqualified them as adoptive parents. Id. at 534 (Broom, J., dissenting). The judge voiced concern about the example that their repudiating the contract would have on other parents waiting for adoption:
To allow the appellants to prevail here is in effect saying to them and to the whole world that once a child's name is placed on the registry, then the first adoption petitioners who win the "foot race" and beat all others to the courthouse door and file their petition first will somehow have priority over anyone else who has obeyed the law and gotten on the list by proper application and complying with established procedures. Id. at 535. The dissent concluded: "By its decision this Court has sanctioned the appellants' unjustifiable repudiation of a solemn contract and allowed them to make an 'end run' thereby magically projecting themselves ahead of the statutory list of others who seek to adopt a child in accordance with established procedures mandated by the legislature." Id.
have the child removed, through no fault of their own, to be adopted elsewhere or returned to the biological parent or parents. They therefore lack both the autonomy and the sense of permanency given to legal parents. 21 The effect on children of these two different relationships -one with full protection of the law, one with characteristics much closer to those of 21 Despite this lack of permanence, the children may love them unconditionally, and "[iut is not surprising then that many children, particularly those that enter foster care at a very early age and have little or no contact with their natural parents during extended stays in foster care, often develop deep emotional ties with their foster parents." Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 836 (1977) . However, the foster parents are supposed to both not expect permanence and, occasionally with difficult children, act as monitoring agents for the police. See, e.g., J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170, 174-76 (Alaska 1975) (discussing foster parent who discovered marijuana in search of child's room and holding that the fact that she was paid by the state did not necessarily mean that Fourth Amendment prohibitions applied to her activities). For another illustration of the lack of permanence in this context, see a recent story in the local diocesan religious newspaper, which talked of a now-elderly woman who for many years following her husband's death took in babies, which she would hurriedly return to the agency. Karen Clifford, Rose Culp Was Foster Parent to 79 Babies, TODAY'S CATHOLIC, Sept. 12, 2010, at 11. The woman indicated that one of the hardest aspects of being a foster parent is not becoming emotionally attached: "One time I had a little boy named Bobby who was about 10 months old when I got him. I was standing at the sink and he came up to me and took my pants and starting [sic] saying 'mama.' My children were calling me mama. I called Peg (her social worker) and said, 'You are going to have to come and get Bobby."' Id.
The State of Indiana requires prospective parents to use the County Office of Family and Children (OFC) or a licensed child-placing agency to facilitate the adoption, though families who plan to adopt their stepchildren, grandchildren, or nieces and nephews can do a direct placement from the child's parents. IND. CODE § 31-19-7-1(a). Adoptive parents are required to get foster care training before adopting. The Department of Child Services describes the difference between adoption and foster parenting (called resource parenting):
Changes in Dynamics when a Resource Parent Adopts When resource parent(s) adopt a child(ren) placed with them on a foster care basis and for whom they have provided a substitute family for a planned period of time, new dynamics develop. Most importantly, there is a shift in roles and role expectations relative to the resource/adoptive family. That shift is felt primarily by the resource parents but definitely affects the child. With life experiences and foster care training and knowledge in hand, resource/adoptive parents perceive clear distinctions between foster care and adoption. Adoption means that resource parents: 1. Are making a commitment to provide permanency for the child; and 2. No longer share decision making responsibility and liability with the agency or court. They are solely responsible, legally and financially, for the total parenting, care, growth, and development of the child. This includes seeing that the long-term developmental, therapeutic, social, medical, educational, and emotional needs of the child are met. commercial fiduciaries -is perhaps not surprising. Children who do not live with legal parents do not fare as well. 22 As adolescents, as the following Table shows, they are more likely to be depressed, to use tobacco, alcohol or marijuana, to be delinquent, and to fear dying or being killed. A more common situation than that of Artyom (of attempting to just return a child), but involving the same sort of problems, surfaces in so-called "wrongful adoption" cases. 24 In these cases, couples who have adopted children through public or private agencies sue the agencies when something turns out to be very wrong with their adopted child. 25 Some, but not all of these cases also involve "disrupted adoptions." 26 In others, the parents sue the agency for fraud and misrepresentation or to recoup the additional costs of raising a disabled 22 See infra Table 1 . 23 In each case, the situations are compared to children living with their biological parent or parents. The equations hold constant the mother's marital status, the child's age and sex, household income, the mother's age, and the mother's and child's race. The standard errors are in parentheses, and * denotes significance at p < 0.05, with ** denoting p < 0. 
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See id. at 1764 (estimating that as many as ten percent of all adoptions are terminated).
The process is simpler in the case of foster parents who find they cannot care for a child. More resources will be provided in the interest of maintaining stability in the child's life, but the child may be removed and placed elsewhere if the placement is ultimately unsuccessful. child for whom they had not bargained, but these parents do not terminate the adoption.
27
Elsewhere I have analogized the problem of wrongful adoption to the "market for lemons," justly made famous by economist George Akerlof. 28 In order to allow for the adoption of disabled and other "hard to place" children, I argued that some amount of fraud may be optimal. 29 [Vol. 91:1231
FOSTER PARENTS AS FIDUCIARIES
perspective, being adopted is better than foster care. Agencies, who are often staffed by people highly sympathetic to these children and wishing their placement for both altruistic and financial motivations, 30 will tend to stress the children's good points and at least play down their least desirable qualities.
An adoptive parent may be seen as a purchaser who acquires a baby at considerable cost (in terms of cash, time, and emotional investment) from a seller (usually an agency). The seller possesses more information about the baby than the buyer, 31 and, except in open adoption cases, it is often impossible for the adoptive parent to discover this important "quality information" about disability prior to consummating the transaction.
3 2 Such problems as fetal alcohol syndrome or autism do not appear for months.
33
"Older children who were victims of sexual abuse by their parents may not show unusual behavior until they reach puberty. The requirement of agency investigation of birth parents and adoptive homes is designed to overcome some of these information problems.
'34 Because agencies cannot charge a higher price for compliance -since states forbid child selling -the agencies have incentives to place the greatest number of children rather than to ensure the quality of the children placed.
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"Once the child has been placed with adoptive parents and a major problem is discovered, the question becomes one of remedy. In some cases, adoptions are annulled because of agency misrepresentation or nondisclosure. ' 1989) . In Michael J., the child had clear symptoms of a progressive neurological disease, which the county maintained was just a birthmark. 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505. In this case, it is the agency, not the parents, acting in a fiduciary capacity:
By recognizing an action for intentional misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment, we are not imposing on the agency a duty to predict the future health of a prospective adoptee. However, there must be a good faith full disclosure of material facts concerning existing or past conditions of the child's health. If the adoptive parents had been informed of the doctor's refusal to make a prognosis they would have been placed on notice, allowing a consideration of the significance of such refusal and an independent inquiry into the matter. The County was not without the means or resources with which to competently investigate the total medical condition of an obviously blemished child. Public policy cannot extend to condone concealment or intentional misrepresentation which misleads prospective adoptive parents about the unusual calamity they are assuming. The adoption of a child is an act of compassion, love and humanitarian concern where the adoptive parent voluntarily assumes enormous legal, moral, social and financial obligations. Accordingly, a trustworthy process benefits society, as well as the child and parent. As keepers of the conscience of the community, we cannot countenance conduct which would allow persons who desire entrance into the emotional realm of parenting to be unprotected from schemes or tactics designed to discharge societal burdens onto the unsuspecting or unwary. 40 See, e.g., Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1106-08, 1112 (allowing a suit in negligence for misrepresenting the adopted child's background because social worker told adoptive parents that six year old child was healthy, even though she knew that the child was suffering from cerebral atrophy (a wasting away of brain tissues) and that her mother was a committed mental patient diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic reactionary). According to Brione B. Pattison, Note, Case Retrospective: Mohr v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Pamela Tompkins, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 267 (1999), while the adoptive parents admit that they would not have agreed to meet and adopt the child had they known of her medical and family history, "they love her very much" and insist that "they never considered annulling the adoption and returning Betsy to the care of the state." Id. at 275. Similarly, see Ambrose v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 736 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. 1999) (recounting case where father had history of mental illness, which agency failed to disclose, and child was later diagnosed with bipolar disorder); Roe v. Jewish Children's Bureau, 790 N.E.2d 882, recover for past or future medical expenses," the courts reasoned, "even though the agencies were not guarantors of the child's health. The courts noted that although the agencies knew of the genetic or other problems, the parents could not have discovered the illness or disability through their own diligence." 4 ' In other reported cases, the parents' suits were barred. 42 In some, the defects were not substantial, although the parents would not have wished them. For example, one child was deaf, 43 while in another case the child turned out to be unavailable for adoption because his father had never given consent. 44 "In others, although the agencies might have negligently failed to discover the problem, plaintiffs could not show fraud or prove that they would not have adopted the child had they known of the problems. '45 As one court wrote:
In short, to impose liability in a case such as this would in effect make the adoption agency a guarantor of the infant's future good health.... To do so would put adoption agencies in a quagmire because they want to continue to perform this service. Yet, they could not afford an unreasonable responsibility of guaranteeing the health of a child. Even natural parents are without this guarantee. 46 I have written before:
In most cases, returning the children to their birth parents or the agencies that placed them ... presents an unacceptable alternative. Children need stability, particularly early in their lives. Disabled children may need a stable, loving home even more than those without special needs. Rescission of the adoption contract therefore loses power as a device because of the third-party effects, or externalities, involved....
The special needs of hard-to-place infants create another barrier to recovery: a heightened burden of proof of fraud. Particularly if the 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (describing agency's failure to disclose mother's mental illness to parents who asked for a child whose parents had no history of mental or emotional problems and the child developed a whole series of mental health issues).
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adoptive parents expressed a willingness to accept a special needs child, courts will be reluctant to penalize the agency by a finding of fraud and concomitant damages even if the agency withheld some important medical or psychological information. If these 'wrongful adoption' cases became routine, the government would have even fewer incentives to attempt permanent placement of disabled children, thus forcing still more to remain in permanent foster care. 47 Further, as in the "wrongful life" cases brought a generation ago, 48 the courts in the adoption fraud cases confront situations in which damages are very difficult to measure. Even if the child has some trait that the adoptive parent would have wished to avoid, he or she is nonetheless a human being, capable of giving and receiving love. As with the "wrongful birth" children, the courts typically find that the positive aspects of having a child outweigh the negative.
49 "Taken as a whole, the child presents a net benefit to the adoptive parents despite the misinformation."
50 Thus parents who annul adoptions (and perhaps those who recover damages as well) will face considerable stigma, substantially more than the fiduciary who gets the court to relieve him or her from the fiduciary obligation. Finally, there is some evidence that suggests that the agencies' withholding information from parents may actually be doing the child good. 51 The Iowa Adoption Study matched and compared children with birthmothers of about the same age and adopted through the same agency from 1950-1969.52 In each pair, one child had parents with known problems -substance abuse, mental illness or criminal history -and the other did not. 53 These children have been followed to the present, and a great deal is known about them. A number of 4' BRINIG, supra note 28, at 70. 48 See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957 (Cal. 1982) . "Wrongful life" cases are typically those brought on the child's behalf, and "wrongful birth" cases are those brought by parents. Id. at 957 n.4. 41 papers look at the relative effect of their genetic endowments (their biological parents' problems) versus the influence of "nurture" -the adoptive homes in which they grew up. 54 For the present purposes, one extremely interesting finding is that where the adoptive parents knew of the problems in the biological background, the children fared worse than when they did not. 55 This kind of result seems to go well beyond the fiduciary relationships in Professor Frankel's book.
The other piece of empirical evidence I would like to offer here deals with the attenuation of the parental relationship, not through an action as rare as that of Torry Hansen or concerning the parents whose children are in foster care, 5 6 but through the much more common occurrence of loss of custody at separation or divorce. 57 The argument is that having a legal agreement or order giving custody to the other parent, while maintaining that the noncustodial parent remains "fit," impliedly dubs him (since the majority are fathers) less trustworthy than the other in a normative sense. An award of custody to the child's mother means that as far as the child's welfare is concerned (the so-called "best interests of the child"), placement with the mother is preferable. 58 Here we are interested in the effect that the lack of societal trust has on the fathers, holding other things constant. [1987] [1988] and included personal interviews with 13,007 respondents. In 1992-1994, 10,007 of these individuals were re-interviewed. The dependent variable is the CEDS2, a brief version of the "Centers for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale."
Averages for married respondents were 13.0843, for divorced 18.07. Respondents are compared to those who never married. "In practical terms, loss of custody through a legal agreement or decision increases depression by about 4 points or 1/4 of a standard deviation on average." Brinig & Nock, supra note 57, at 480. This is even while taking into account the greater risk of depression following separation from the marriage (and, inferentially, from the child).
Foster parents are fiduciaries in Professor Frankel's sense: their relationships with the children for whom they care formally begin in most cases by contract. They are frequently compensated for the caretaking they do. 61 They receive formal training by the state and typically expect their relationship to be temporary. 62 While children are in their care, they are expected to place the children's interests above their own and to safeguard their welfare. 63 Adoption agencies have also been given the responsibility of fiduciaries in the placement of children in their care. Remedies are, as Rob
Sitkoff's The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law suggests, designed to deter fiduciaries who do not place their principals' concerns first. 64 why the loss of custody is so devastating -the noncustodial parent loses a good part of the benefit while continuing to bear the financial obligations of parenthood. In the end, then, the difference between parents and fiduciaries, as Professor Frankel portrays them, seems to be one of gift as opposed to contract, love rather than exchange.
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foster care sought to sue for damages of emotional and psychological injury caused by their mothers' failure to perform their parental duties to them. In denying their claim for relief because the state had a comprehensive plan of assuring adequate care for children and removing them when the care was not provided, the court noted that "there is a limitation to the extent to which use may be made of tort actions for the purpose of accomplishing social aims. . . . There are certain kinds of relationships which are not proper fodder for tort litigation, and we believe this to be one of them." Id. at 1111. 79 (1991) , for the conclusion that, regardless of moral reasoning characteristics and religiosity, an exchange relationship was inconsistent with marital happiness.
